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+# Computer Security - lesson 9
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+#### Stefano Zanero
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+###### 21 April 2016
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+## Preparing the Memory
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+To effectively use the buffer overflow we need to create the exploit buffer
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+and put it in memory using a helper program, the exploit buffer will include
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+half size of nops, and following the shellcode and the ESP.
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+
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+We may want to have more than one repetition of the ESP because if the program
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+we are attacking is distributed already compiled, we can be precise
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+but if it has been compiled ad-hoc, then it may have offsets.
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+A clever script prepares the buffer and loads it into an environment variable `EGG`
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+before starting a terminal, then i can `./executable < `echo $EGG` and pass the buffer
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+that i couldn't have written by keyboard.
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+We can make a more effective shellcode making it tinier, with the same techniques
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+that were used in the demo-scene.
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+We can alternatively use the saved EIP of a function pointer if that function is accessible
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+by our buffer and run before the exploit.
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+One of the most common programming error is the *off-by-one* made by counting arrays
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+starting from 1 instead of 0.
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+
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+## Defense from buffer overflows
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+The main cause are programming errors
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+### Source code level defense
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+- Use safer librearies, es: `strncopy` checks for input size.
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+### Compiler level defenses
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+- Compilers can notify about source code mistakes
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+- Randomly allocation of variables on the stack
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+- Use of a canary that is a sacrificable piece of code, that
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+is checked to make sure the buffer was not exploited
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+(Reference from canaries used by miners)
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+Static canaries can be easily replaced, there are
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+more effective tecniques like __Terminator canaries__ (made of \0)
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+and __Random canaries__
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+If we seek performance we may disable canaries by NOT using `-fstack-protector`
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+Buf for normal programs it should stay enabled.
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+
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+- Operating System level:
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+ - Non executable stack, e.g. NX bit that make the program crash if jump into a section of memory with NX enabled
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+ - Address Layout Randomization; for example in linux the stack is shifted in a 2MB range every execution.
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+
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+## Format String Bugs
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+
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